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A RIGHT TO LIFE DENIED OR 
A RIGHT TO DIE HONORED? 
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There is a spectrum of positions on end of life issues, and on 
life issues generally. However, a crucial line of division exists be-
tween those who affirm, and those who deny, that the life of 
each human being possesses inherent and equal worth and dig-
nity, irrespective not only of race, ethnicity, age, sex, etc., but 
also irrespective of stage of development, mental or physical in-
firmity, and condition of dependency. 
People who deny this proposition frequently distinguish what 
they describe as "mere biological human life" from the life of a 
person. It is persona/life, they say, that has value (even intrinsic 
value) and dignity; "mere biological life" does not. And personal 
life is the life of a being that possesses self-consciousness and, 
perhaps, developed capacities for characteristic human mental ac-
tivity, such as conceptual thinking, deliberation, and choice.1 
So some people argue that there are human beings who are 
not yet persons-namely, those in the embryonic, fetal, and at 
least early infant stages of development- and other human be-
ings who will never become, or are no longer, persons-these-
verely retarded, the seriously demented, those in permanent co-
mas or persistent vegetative states.2 For people who hold this 
view, the question is not when does the life of a human being be-
gin or end, but when does a human being qualify as a person, 
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and therefore a creature with a serious right to life. Those hu-
man beings whom they regard as non-persons, human individu-
als possessing merely biological life, do not possess such a right, 
though it may, depending on a variety of possible factors, be 
wrong to kill them for some reason other than respect for the in-
herent dignity of persons-for example, without the consent of 
their parents or others who have a claim to them. Peter Singer 
crystallized this general point that not all human beings have a 
right to life in a recent Letter to the Editor to the New York 
Times. Replying to an Op/Ed by Mario Coumo, Singer wrote: 
"The crucial moral question is not when human life begins, but 
when human life reaches the point at which it merits protec-
tion."3 Singer, of course, believes that some human beings do not 
merit protection, namely those in the embryonic, fetal, and in-
fant stages of development,4 as well as those who have not de-
veloped or who have irretrievably lost the capacities Singer iden-
tifies with personhood. I hold the opposite view, namely that all 
human beings, precisely in virtue of their humanity, possess fun-
damental dignity and merit protection. 
In contemporary discourse, the view held by Singer, Tooley, 
and others is often allied, though it needn't be, to a sweeping be-
lief in the value of autonomy as a core right of persons. Cen-
trally, the right of autonomy immunizes individual choice against 
interference by others, including the state, in matters having to 
do with how one leads one's own life, especially where one's ac-
tions do not directly impinge negatively upon the interests or 
rights of others. So, the thought goes, if a woman wishes to abort 
a fetus, or parents wish to terminate the life of a severely dis-
abled newborn, or a person wishes to end his own life with the 
assistance of other willing persons, respect for autonomy de-
mands that others, including public officials acting under color of 
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law, refrain from interfering with these choices, and perhaps 
even take positive steps to facilitate them.5 
Now, those who oppose abortion, infanticide, assisted sui-
cide, euthanasia, etc., as I do, oppose them because we reject the 
idea that there are or can be pre-personal or post-personal hu-
man beings, or human non-persons of any description; and we do 
not accept the sweeping view of the value of autonomy. We de-
fend a doctrine of inherent and equal dignity that affirms all liv-
ing human beings as persons who merit protection; that excludes 
the direct killing of innocent human beings; and that demands 
respect for every individual's right to life. Most of us also believe 
that the law should honor the principle of the inherent and equal 
dignity of every member of the human family and not privilege 
the belief in autonomy over it. We view human life, even in de-
veloping or severely mentally disabled conditions, as inherently 
and unconditionally valuable, and though we regard individual 
autonomy as an important value, we understand it to be an in-
strumental and conditional one-one that is morally bounded by 
a range of ethical considerations, including but not limited to 
others' autonomy.6 Many of our opponents take precisely the 
opposite view: autonomy has intrinsic worth; so-called biological 
life is of instrumental or conditional value.7 
I have elsewhere stated at length my reasons for believing 
that the life of every human being has inherent and equal worth, 
and for rejecting the proposition that some livin~ human beings 
are not persons and therefore lack a right to life. As stated ear-
lier, those who deny that all human beings are human persons do 
so based upon arguments revolving around the importance of 
immediately exercisable capacities for characteristically human 
mental functions. The core of my argument identifies the arbi-
trariness of treating only immediately exercisable capacities, as op-
posed to basic natural capacities, for characteristically human 
5. See generally, DWORKIN, supra note 1. 
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ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999) (hereinafter GEORGE, IN 
DEFENSE] on issues of moral philosophy. 
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mental functions as the ground of dignity and basic rights. I point 
out that human embryos, fetuses, and infants do possess, albeit in 
radical ( = root) form, a capacity or potentiality for such mental 
functions. Human beings possess this radical capacity precisely in 
virtue of the kind of entity they are, and possess it by coming into 
being as that kind of entity-viz., a being with a rational nature. 
Human embryos and fetuses cannot of course immediately exer-
cise these capacities. Still, they are related to these capacities dif-
ferently than, say, a canine or feline embryo is. They are the kind 
of being-a natural kind, members of a biological species-which, 
if not prevented by extrinsic causes, in due course develops by ac-
tive self-development to the point at which capacities initially pos-
sessed in root form become immediately exercisable. (Of course, 
the capacities in question become immediately exercisable only 
some months or years after the child's birth.) Each human being 
comes into existence possessing the internal resources and active 
disposition to develop the immediately exercisable capacity for 
higher mental functions. Only the adverse effects on them of 
other causes will prevent this development. 
I have also stated, at book-length, my reasons for rejecting 
the doctrine of the priority of autonomy and the political princi-
ples following from it.9 In this work, I propose to show that theo-
ries of morality that treat autonomy as intrinsically valuable, or 
seek to derive a sweeping right to autonomy (or "privacy" or 
"moral independence") from the value of equality or some other 
putatively fundamental normative principle, enmesh themselves 
in contradictions and conundrums that cannot be resolved with-
out adjusting the theories to limit in significant ways the scope of 
autonomy. I will not in the limited space available here rehearse 
these arguments. What I will do is try to give some indication of 
how I think someone on my side of the debate on these matters 
ought to think about issues of the sort that came to the fore in 
the Terri Schiavo case. 
The position was summed up a few years ago in a statement 
by the Ramsey Colloquium of the Institute on Religion and Public 
Life entitled, "Always to Care; Never to Kill: A Declaration on 
Euthanasia. "10 We are to maintain solidarity with those in disabled 
conditions, seeking to heal their afflictions when we can, and mak-
9. See GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL, supra note 6. 
10. See Hadley Arkes et al., Always to Care, Never to KilL· A Dec~ration on ~utha­
nasia, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 45, available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ 
ft9202Jarticles/documentation.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). An abbreviated version of 
the declaration appeared in the WALL STREET JOURNAL on November 27,1991. 
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ing every effort to relieve their suffering and discomfort. At the 
same time, we should bring encouragement to anyone who is 
tempted to regard his life, currently or prospectively, as valueless 
or merely burdensome to himself or others, and discourage such a 
person from committing suicide or regarding his life as worthless. 
We should certainly not cooperate in suicidal choices or support 
the practice of assisted suicide or euthanasia. 
Does this imply "vitalism," that is, the view that human life 
is not only inherently valuable but that it is the supreme value 
that trumps all others? Does it mean that we must struggle to 
keep dying patients alive at all costs? 
No. 
The key distinction, however, is not between "killing" and 
"letting die," though I have come to think that this distinction 
(properly understood} is not always morally meaningless. Nor is 
the distinction between killing by a positive act and killing by not 
acting when one could act to preserve life (which is sometimes run 
together with the distinction between "killing" and "letting die"). 
Nor, strictly speaking, is the crucial distinction between the use of 
"ordinary" as opposed to "extraordinary" means of life-support, 
at least where "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are defined in 
terms of the complexity or novelty of the technologies employed. 
Rather, the key is the distinction between, on the one hand, what 
traditionally has been called "direct killing," where death (one's 
own or someone else's) is sought either as an end-in-itself or as a 
means to some other end; and, on the other hand, accepting death 
(or the shortening of life) as a foreseen side-effect of an action (or 
omission) whose object is something other than death-some 
good (or the avoidance of some evil} that cannot be achieved in 
the circumstances in ways that do not result in death or the short-
ening of life.11 Of course, I should add that the norm against the 
direct killing of innocent human beings is not the only norm that 
can be relevant to end-of-life decisions. There are norms, such as 
obligations of fairness and equity, that apply even in cases of ac-
cepting death as a side-effect. To show that an act which causes 
death or shortens life is not an act of direct killing is not necessar-
ily to show that it is a morally legitimate act. 
11. See Patrick Lee, Personhood, Dignity, Suicide, and Euthanasia, THE NATIONAL 
CATHOUC BIOETHICS QUARTERLY, Autumn 2001, at 329; Chris Tollefsen, Euthanasia 
and the Culture of Life, http://www.princeton.edu/-prolife/articles/tollefsen.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2006). 
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There are some classic examples of the distinction that I 
think is central. A soldier jumps on a grenade that has been rolled 
into the camp in a life sacrificing effort to save the lives of his 
comrades in arms. Because his own death, while foreseen and ac-
cepted, is outside the scope of his intention, no one regards this as 
a suicide or an act of direct self-killing. The soldier's objective is 
not his own death, but rather saving the lives of his comrades, by 
absorbing the blow of the grenade. Should he somehow miracu-
lously survive the blow while muffling its force, he will have fully 
achieved his aim. His surviving would in no way frustrate his ob-
jectives. Perhaps, more obviously relevant to the issues here under 
discussion is the case of a patient suffering from a painful condi-
tion who takes palliative drugs of a type that he knows will result 
in his dying sooner than he would otherwise. Again, death, though 
foreseen and accepted, is not the object of the patient's act; it is 
beyond the scope of his intention-which is solely to relieve the 
pain of his disease-and, we may assume, his willingness to accept 
death is not incompatible with any obligation he may happen to 
have to others (though, if it is incompatible with any such obliga-
tion-such as an obligation to children or other family members-
the moral equation obviously changes). 
Now, there are lots of reasons people in extremis, or who 
anticipate being in extremis, may have for declining life support 
that do not implicate the person in willing his own death either 
as an end-in-itself or as a means to some other end. Particular 
forms of life support may be painful, burdensome, and expen-
sive. When they are, people can certainly choose to forego them 
without willing their own deaths. So someone who thinks as I do, 
may support, as I in fact support, giving people broad latitude to 
decide whether to accept life support and whether to continue it 
once accepted. This is one of the places where respect for auton-
omy makes a valid claim in the ethical framework I have 
sketched. Of course, in giving people this latitude it is to be ex-
pected that some people will act on it for reasons that are not 
morally legitimate within that framework, but this is itself a fore-
seeable, but acceptable, bad side-effect of a good policy. The 
policy itself has as its aim something perfectly good and legiti-
mate-respecting people's autonomy to choose among morally 
acceptable (even if tragic) but incompatible options bearing on 
their lives and futures. Though this freedom may be misused to 
choose morally wrongful options, it is not the intent of the policy 
to enable those choices. The intent is to allow choice among the 
many morally legitimate options. 
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But this does not mean that we should accept a right to as-
sisted suicide. Nor should we conceive the right to decline life-
support (or life-saving medical care generally) as a right to 
commit suicide or to receive assistance in committing suicide. 
Policies or practices that are implicitly premised on belief in a 
right to suicide or assisted suicide or euthanasia should be 
roundly rejected. 
Terri Schiavo died of dehydration. Her death was not the 
result of brain damage or any other affliction. It was chosen as 
the precise object of a decision to deny her fluids. She was not 
"allowed to die," for she was not dying; she was not, as I heard 
AI Franken claim on television, "brain dead"; she was not even 
terminally ill. The choice to deny her fluids was a choice to cause 
her death. Those who supported that choice said it was right ei-
ther because she wasn't really a person anymore, or that death 
was what she herself wanted, as she allegedly made clear in 
comments later recalled and placed into evidence by her hus-
band.12 Either way, the killing of Terri Schiavo cannot be justi-
fied under the moral understanding I defend and that has tradi-
tionally governed medical ethics, whatever erosions it has 
suffered in recent years. Under that understanding, Terri was a 
person with a right to life; she was neither a non-person ("mere 
biological life," a "vegetable") nor a person with a right to com-
mit suicide. The obligation of others towards her was "always to 
care; never to kill. "13 
Does this mean that it is never morally acceptable to with-
hold fluids or food from a patient? Is it never right for a patient 
or individuals making medical decisions on behalf of a patient to 
decline food and fluids? 
Some people on my side of the debate have argued that 
food and fluids must always be administered-that they are 
"hospitality" rather than life support, and are part of "ordinary" 
care rather than extraordinary means. I agree that food and flu-
ids are in most cases (or, as Pope John Paul II put it in his allocu-
tion on the subject, "in principle"t part of ordinary care, but 
12 See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, The Time Has Come to Let Terri Schiavo Die, MSNBC, 
Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/72314401 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
13. See my interview with NRO, "Always to Care, Never to Kill," NATIONAL 
REVIEW ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/ 
george200503211140.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
14. See the address Pope John Paul II gave on March 20,2004 to the participants in 
the International Congress, "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific 
Advances and Ethical Dilemmas," http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_iil 
speeches/2004/march/documentslhfjp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc_en.htmi?GRAB 
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there can be cases, I believe, in which they can be legitimately 
not administered. That is because there can be cases in which the 
reason for not administering them is some goal or purpose other 
than the desire to bring about death. These are cases, compara-
tively rare to be sure, in which food and fluids are themselves 
medically contraindicated, because they cannot be administered 
without causing harm to the patient. Sometimes the problem will 
be in the administration of the food and fluids, and sometimes it 
will be a consequence of the food and fluids themselves. In ei-
ther type of case, where the administration of food and fluid will 
cause or contribute to morbidity or even hasten death, plainly a 
decision to withhold them need not be a choice to kill. 
Obviously, what I have in mind here was not part of the pic-
ture in the Schiavo case. The point of withholding food and flu-
ids from Terri Schiavo was precisely to bring about her death. 
The problem was not that she could not tolerate the food and 
fluids or that the administration of them would further damage 
her health. On the contrary, food and water would sustain her in 
life-a life that some judged to be in itself burdensome, both to 
Terri herself and to others, and which she, they contend, would 
have wanted to end were she in a position to decide the ques-
tion. From the perspective of those who supported removing her 
feeding tube, doing so was a means of ending her life; it was not 
a side effect of a choice whose object was something else. It was 
a choice to kill, a choice the moral logic of which is indistin-
guishable from a choice to have ended her life more quickly by, 
for example, administering a lethal dose in an unambiguous act 
of euthanasia. 
Nothing in my analysis is changed by the recent release of 
Terri Schiavo's autopsy results. Though many have touted the 
autopsy as vindication for Michael Schiavo and those who sup-
ported his efforts to remove nutrition and hydration, I do not 
think the results merit such a conclusion. Questions such as 
whether Terri was in a PVS or not, whether she had the possibil-
ity of regaining consciousness or not, whether her brain was 
"profoundly atrophied" or not, were irrelevant to her status as a 
human person. What mattered was that Terri was alive, was not 
in the process of dying, and would continue to live unless some-
one chose to kill her, whether by dehydration or some more effi-
cient means. 
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